The 2015 Act imposes a duty on the Government to allocate 0.7% of GNI to international aid each year and introduces independent evaluation of that spending. If an annual report (in practice the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s annual report) is laid before Parliament showing that the 0.7% target has not been met, then the Secretary of State “must, as soon as reasonably practicable” lay a statement before Parliament explaining why the target has not been met, “and, if relevant, refer to the effect of one or more of the following:

• economic circumstances and, in particular, any substantial change in gross national income;

• fiscal circumstances and, in particular, the likely impact of meeting the target on taxation, public spending and public borrowing;

• circumstances arising outside the United Kingdom.”

The statement must also detail any steps that the Secretary of State has taken to ensure the 0.7% target will be met the following calendar year.

The law contains no enforcement mechanism beyond this reporting requirement. Indeed, Section 3 of the Act is explicit that the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament and no one else. It is an ouster clause – a provision that prevents the courts from reviewing decisions made by the Government. It explicitly states that non-compliance does not make Government action unlawful.

During the Act’s passage, critics questioned its enforceability. Some MPs warned that declaratory legislation – laws passed to make a statement rather than impose a real obligation – would have no value without meaningful sanctions. Supporters argued that enshrining the target in law would increase accountability, as political embarrassment would deter future governments from failing to meet it. The current situation suggests otherwise.

In 2006 the Labour Government passed the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006 which imposed an annual duty on the Secretary of State to forecast when a target of 0.7% spending on international aid would be met.

Three years later the Government produced a draft Official Development Assistance Bill which proposed replacing that duty to ‘forecast’ with a new duty to ‘meet’ the 0.7% target. The Bill was subject to pre-legislative scrutiny by the International Development Select Committee, which reported just before the 2010 general election.

The three main political parties went into that general election each committing in their manifestos to spend 0.7% GNI on international aid and to legislate to enshrine that commitment in law. The UK achieved the 0.7% target in 2013 for the first time.

However, it was through a Private Members’ Bill (PMB) rather than a Government Bill that the target was enshrined in law. Liberal Democrat MP, Michael Moore, came second in the PMB ballot in the 2014-15 Session and brought forward the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill which was largely modelled on the earlier 2009-10 draft bill.

The Bill passed with Government support – the Liberal Democrats being part of the Coalition – so received little scrutiny, particularly regarding the clauses setting out the mechanism for Ministers’ accountability to Parliament.

During scrutiny of the Bill in the House of Commons, very little attention was paid to what would happen if Ministers failed to meet the 0.7% target. The mechanism for ministerial accountability to Parliament was set out in clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill. In Committee in the House of Commons, these two clauses were considered together, were disposed of in just five minutes, and were agreed by MPs without a formal division.

No reference was made in the Commons debate to the fact that the International Development Committee had previously recommended (in relation to the near identical draft International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill of 2010) that the legislation “should not try to pre-empt or legitimise failure by including a list of acceptable reasons for missing the target.” Nor was there any reference made to the Select Committee’s conclusion that the accountability measures would “provide the Government with an easy excuse for not meeting the target.” And the Committee’s recommendation – that the Bill should mandate the Government to include an action plan in its annual report to address any shortfall if the target were not met – was not adopted.

In the House of Lords there was a little more debate, but even there it was still quite limited. Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, however, did warn his fellow Peers that the Bill did not impose a statutory duty to spend 0.7%, rather it "simply imposes a duty to tell Parliament if this has not been done and to give a reason for that."

In November 2020, amid the economic fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic, the Government announced in the Comprehensive Spending Review that it would cut international aid to 0.5% as “a temporary measure”. Initially, Ministers suggested legislation would be needed. The Chancellor, Rishi Sunak, and Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, both said that as they could not predict with certainty when the fiscal situation would improve, the Government intended to “look at bringing forward appropriate legislation in due course”, to amend the law. By March 2021, however, they had reversed course, claiming the economic emergency justified breaching the target without legal changes.

Former International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell MP warned that failing to seek parliamentary approval risked creating an “unlawful Budget.” The Prime Minister dismissed these concerns, asserting that the Government was “entitled to vary that 0.7% commitment” in exceptional circumstances.

This raised a troubling constitutional question: should an Act allow for premeditated non-compliance? If so, Ministers can effectively rewrite the target through executive fiat whenever they choose, undermining its purpose.

Former Solicitor General Lord Garnier rejected this interpretation: “Until Parliament changes that law on the statutory duty to meet the 0.7% target the Government must aim to hit it,” he wrote. “It cannot deliberately aim off or fire blanks. It can say it intends to change the law or substitute another target but, until the statute is repealed or amended, the Government is subject to that law. It cannot legitimise a failure to hit the target by announcing in advance its intention to fail.” If the Government wanted to reduce aid, it should bring forward legislation, he insisted, not simply declare their intention to break the law.

In June 2021, Andrew Mitchell MP attempted to restore the 0.7% target by amending the Advanced Research and Invention Agency Bill. The Speaker ruled the amendment out of scope but demanded that the Government find a way to let the House of Commons decide on the issue formally.

A month later, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak set two fiscal conditions for reinstating the 0.7% target. In a Written Statement he said that the target would be met when the independent Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts confirmed that, on a sustainable basis (a term that he did not define):

• the Government is not borrowing for day-to-day spending; and

• underlying debt is falling.

The Government then put a non-binding motion to the House of Commons the following day, 13 July 2021, stating that aid would only return to 0.7% once these conditions were met. However, the Chancellor had warned that if MPs rejected the motion, aid spending would return to 0.7%, likely triggering tax hikes or spending cuts elsewhere. The motion passed by 35 votes, despite opposition from former Prime Minister Theresa May and several Select Committee chairs.

The next day, in the Lords, former Conservative Cabinet member Lord Fowler challenged the Government’s handling of the issue: “Surely the vote yesterday means that an Act of Parliament passed by both Houses has been overturned by a last-minute Motion passed by just one House, in spite of clear Government commitments in November that they would bring forward proper legislation.”

The former Lord Chief Justice Lord Judge went further: “Is it consistent with the sovereignty of Parliament” he asked, “that an obligation or duty imposed on the Government by primary legislation can be expunged or suspended by Ministerial Statement?”

The answer, it seemed, was yes – provided that enough MPs were willing to let it happen.

Labour’s 2024 election manifesto pledged to restore the 0.7% aid target “as soon as fiscal circumstances allow”. However, its first budget in October signalled a continuation of the Conservative economic tests. Now, the Prime Minister has gone further, pre-announcing a cut to 0.3% with no prospect of hitting the target this Parliament.

In the Summer, the FCDO’s annual report will confirm yet again that the 0.7% target will not be met. Under the Act, the Government must then lay a statement before Parliament explaining the shortfall and outlining any steps taken to ensure the target will be met the following calendar year. This accountability process will be a hollow exercise. The failure to reach 0.7% is a political choice, and the Government’s response will likely be a vague commitment to meeting the target when economic and security conditions improve. The Act’s intended purpose – providing certainty for international aid spending – has been undermined. The Government’s position has now reverted to that set out for it in the 2006 Act, which required it only to forecast when the target might be met.

Ministers have not indicated they will follow the 2020-21 precedent by tabling a motion for MPs to formally support their position – even though, given the Government’s large majority, such a move would carry little political risk. Instead, accountability may be left to backbenchers using the tools at their disposal – ministerial questions, backbench business and adjournment debates — to raise concerns and objections, none of which can force a binding vote.

The handling of the 0.7% aid target highlights several problems in the legislative process:

The dangers of declaratory legislation: Laws that are essentially symbolic, made for purely political publicity purposes – to signal a government’s commitment to a policy or principle, rather than to remedy a legal problem or achieve a specific legal objective – may be politically advantageous, at least in the short-term, but they are legally unnecessary and often store up trouble for the future. They prioritise gesture politics rather than good government. The initial advantages derived from legislating for the 0.7% target – in the media, diplomatic gatherings and the court of public opinion – are now outweighed by the damage caused by the breaching of the target. Considerable legal and administrative resource, as well as parliamentary time, has in the meantime been wasted on the matter over the last decade.

Poor legislative scrutiny in the House of Commons: Because all three major parties supported the aid target, MPs failed to properly interrogate its safeguards. Crucial weaknesses in ministerial accountability went unchallenged. The recommendations of a Select Committee – which presciently highlighted many of the problems that have since come to pass – were ignored. Difficult questions were asked by half a dozen MPs, but they were the ‘usual suspects’ who regularly opposed Private Members’ Bills and who were a thorn in their own party’s side. Consequently, their arguments fell on stony ground when in practice many of the problems they pointed to have since arisen.

Executive dominance over Parliament: If Ministers can override legislation simply with a statement, the balance of power shifts further towards the executive, weakening parliamentary oversight and undermining trust in the legal process. Statements to the House of Commons would be stronger accountability mechanisms if backed up by requirements for scrutiny by a relevant Select Committee and a resolution of one or both Houses.

If the 0.7% target is no longer a binding commitment, the Government should have the honesty to amend or repeal the Act rather than allow continued breaches of its statutory duty. Politically, of course it is easier to ignore a law rather than repeal it, even when its purpose has been abandoned. But the current approach – keeping the law on the books but disregarding it when expedient – erodes both legal certainty and democratic accountability.